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COMMENT
REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
[T]he perpetual tragedy of history is that things are perpetually being done
ten or twenty years too late.1
Twenty-six years after the Bretton Woods Agreement founded the In-
ternational Monetary Fund,2 the Board of Governors adopted Resolu-
tion Number 26-9, dated October 1, 1971.3 Citing the ". . dangers of
instability and disorder in currency and trade relationships . . ."4 and
declaring that it is of the utmost importance "... to avoid the aforesaid
dangers and assure continuance of the progress made in national and
international wellbeing in the past quarter of a century. ." the Board
of Governors requested the Executive Directors:
(a) . . . to make reports to the Board of Governors without delay on the
measures that are necessary or desirable for the improvement or reform of
the international monetary system; and
(b) for the purpose of (a), to study all aspects of the international monetary
system, including the role of reserve currencies, gold and special drawing
rights, convertibility, the provisions of the Articles with respect to exchange
rates, and the problems caused by distabilizing capital movements; . . .6
In response to this request, the Executive Directors of the International
Monetary Fund submitted, on August 18, 1972, a preliminary report on
"Reform of the International Monetary System". 7
I
BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT
A. THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM S
The cornerstone of the international monetary system as it has existed
since the dose of World War II is the International Monetary Fund
1. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement-Twenty-five Years After, 23 STAN. L. REv.
235, 275 (1971), quoting from L. Wool.F, DOWNmLL ALL THE WAY 225 (1968).
2. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401 (1946), T.IAS. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, amended [1968] 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S.
No. 6748 (approved May 31, 1968; entered into force July 28, 1969) [hereinafter cited as
IMF Articles]. See also IMF, ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND (1945).
3. IMF, SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS ANNUAL MEErING 1971, 331.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 332.
7. IMF, Refota of the International Monetary System: A Report by the Executive
Directors to the Board of Governors (1972) [hereinafter cited as Report on Reform].
8. The following sources may be useful as a glossary for those unfamiliar with the
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(IMF). With a current membership of 120 nations,0 the IMF is a perma-
nent international organization whose purpose is to promote interna-
tional monetary cooperation and to aid in the growth of international
trade and development.10 The decision-making responsibility of the IMF
is placed in the hands of the Board of Governors, on which all member-
nations are represented. In practice the day-to-day operations are con-
ducted by the Executive Directors, assisted by a highly qualified staff of
about six hundred international civil servants. 1
To avoid repetition of the restrictive trade policies and competitive
devaluations which characterized world trade during the inter-war pe-
riod,12 and at the same time to achieve its stated goals, the IMF Articles
of Agreement have provided a framework for international monetary
"trade language" of the present international monetary system: F. MACHLUP, REMAKING
THE INTERNATIONA. MONETARY SYsTEM (1968), which is an excellent source on the termi-
nology involving SDR's; D. SNIDER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1967);
B. TEw, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION (8th ed., 1965), which is particularly
valuable for its discussion of basic principles; R. TRiFFIN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY SYsrEM (1964), presenting a thorough account of "adjustment";
R. Tmrrsu, GOLD AND THE DOLLAR Cmasis (1960), which presents a thorough consideration
of convertibility and several exchange rate mechanisms.
9. Recent Activity-Fund, 9 FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 71, 74 (Mar. 1972).
10. IMF Articles supra note 2, Art. I. This Article states that the purposes of the
IMF are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution
which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international mone-
tary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and to the development of the productive resources
of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among
members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of
current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange re-
strictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund's resources temporarily avail-
able to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to cor-
rect maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destruc-
tive of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of
disequilibrium in the international balance of payments of members.
11. M. MENDELSOHN, THE IMF AT WORK 3 (undated), reprinted from AMERICAN
BAN~m (Apr. 20, Apr. 28, 1971); Art. XII, § 2 (b) permits the Board of Governors to
delegate any of its powers to the Executive Directors with the specific exception, among
other things, of power to admit new members, revise quotas, initiate uniform par-value
changes, or revise repurchase rules. Art. XXVII (a) permits the same delegation with
respect to SDR's except, among other things, the power to allocate or cancel SDR's, and
the conditions of holding and use of SDR's. IMF Articles, supra note 2.
12. Competitive devaluations and trade restrictions had this effect during the interwar
period, when world trade decreased from $55.9 billion in 1929 to $21.8 billion in 1932.
Note, Legal Problems of International Monetary Reform, 20 STAN. L. REv. 870, 875 n.4
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Legal Problems].
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cooperation within which world trade has flourished for over a quarter
of a century.13
1. Stability of Exchange Rates and Convertibility
The basis of the IMF framework is the establishment of stable ex-
change rates operating through a mechanism which may be called the
"adjustable peg" system.14
In such a system, exchange rates between nations are fixed at a level
expressed in terms of gold or United States dollars.15 The relation of one
currency to gold is referred to as "par-value," while the relation of one
currency to another is referred to as "parity."'6 Member-nations are re-
quired to maintain their prescribed parity through free exchange markets
by buying or selling foreign currencies at the parity level.17 This obliga-
tion may also be satisfied by the free purchase or sale of gold at the
established par-value, although the United States is the only member-
nation which has opted to defend parity in this way.'s
Member-nations may not change their par-value beyond the permitted
margin except to correct a "fundamental disequilibrium."' 9 When such
a situation arises, nations may make the proposed change only with IMF
approval.2 0 The IMF, however, is without power to initiate such changes
itself; its role is essentially passive in this respect.
Through this mechanism, the exchange rate is "pegged." It is "adjust-
able," however, by virtue of the "fundamental disequilibrium" clause.
Convertibility, i.e., the ability to exchange one currency for another, is
also provided for in the IMF Articles.2 ' There are presently thirty-five
nations which have accepted this obligation, including the United States
13. Between 1950 and 1962, for example, world trade grew from approximately $54
billion to $116 billion. Id. at 888. Dollar-value measurements may be deceptive, however,
due to increasing world-wide inflation. See, e.g., IMF, 1971 ANNUAL REPoRT 7.
14. See, e.g., SNIDER, supra note 8, at 840 et seq.
15. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. IV, § 1(a).
16. This definition is that adopted by the Executive Directors. Report on Reform,
supra note 7, at 12 n.l.
17. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. IV, § 4(b).
18. Meier, supra note I, at 248. This option was made available to all member-nations
under the terms of Art. IV, § 4(b).
19. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. IV, § 5(a). The Articles do not define the term
"fundamental disequilibrium." but it can be taken to mean ".... a persistent balance of
payments disequilibrium.., not amenable to correction at prevailing exchange ratesexce pt through controls over current transactions or at the cost of serious unemploy-
ment or inflation." SNmDE, supra note 8, at 845.
20. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. IV, § 5(b).
21. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. VIII, §§ 2, 8, 4.
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and most of Western Europe.22 The remainder have chosen the modified
convertibility status provided for under the Articles, although such status
is only temporary.as
2. Reserves and Balance of Payments
For such a system to function, in addition to a convertibility require-
ment nations must, even when in deficit, have an adequate supply of
reserves on hand in order to meet their obligations. The IMF provides the
necessary supply of reserves by extending credit to member-nations. The
resources necessary to extend this credit are acquired through the sub-
scriptions of member-nations. Upon joining the IMF, each nation is as-
signed a quota, twenty-five per cent of which is payable in gold and the
remainder in the member's currency.24 A member-nation, finding itself
temporarily in a balance of payments deficit, may borrow the reserves it
needs from the IMF resources by means of its "drawing rights."
2 5
Drawing rights initially appear to be a simple purchase operation. A
member-nation in need of foreign currency turns over to the IMF an
amount of its own currency equivalent to the amount of foreign exchange
it needs to finance a deficit. In effect, it buys from the IMF pool the neces-
sary foreign currency at the prevailing exchange rate. The transaction is
actually a credit operation, however, in view of the following require-
ments and restrictions placed upon the drawing member-nation.
First, the member is required to repurchase the amount of his currency
used to buy foreign currency from the IMF pool.26 This may be accom-
plished either with the same foreign exchange borrowed originally, or
with a mixture of other currencies, the stocks of which the IMF may find
depleted through other drawings and in need of being replenished. In
either case, the method of repayment is left to the discretion of the IMF.27
Second, limits are placed on the amount a member-nation may draw
from the IMF. A drawing nation may not draw foreign exchange from
22. MENDELSOHN, supra note 11, at 6.
23. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XIV; see also MENDELSOHN, supra note 11, at 6.
24. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. III. A quota of $100 million thus requires a pay-
ment to the IMF of $25 million in gold and $75 million in the member-nation's cur-
rency; it is thus easy to understand why the first 25 per cent of a member's drawings are
automatic and are referred to as the "gold tranche."
25. An excellent explanation of the operations of IMF drawing rights is presented by
MENDELSOHN, supra note 11, at 7-8.
26. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. V, § 7.
27. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. V, § 7(b).
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the IMF if it would cause IMF holdings of the drawing nation's currency
to increase by more than twenty-five per cent over any twelve month
period, or to exceed the nation's quota by over two hundred per cent.28
Finally, although a member-nation has automatic drawing rights of up
to twenty-five per cent of its quota29-the so-called "gold tranche"--draw-
ings beyond that will be subject to increasingly close scrutiny by the IMF
on the basis of the member's balance of payments situation and the mem-
ber-nation's own attempts to restore equilibrium.
These factors also point out one other major aspect of the present
international monetary system as embodied by the IMF. The framework
attempts basically to deal with, and is predominantly concerned with,
short-term balance of payments deficits.30 Although the IMF will aid in
financing such a deficit, a long-term balance of payments deficit is the
responsibility of the individual member. The attitude is that such a
situation should be cured by the national monetary authorities through
domestic fiscal and monetary policies.
B. THE PROBLEMS WITHIN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM
1. The Position of the United States Dollar
The position of the dollar in the present international monetary sys-
tem, and within the framework of the IMF, is that of a "key currency,"Sl
because as Professor Gerald Meier points out, ". . . the United States is
now the sole country that pegs its currency to gold, [while] other coun-
tries have pegged their currencies in relation to the dollar." 2 Conse-
quently, the dollar is characterized by two functions it performs as an
international currency: first, as the primary intervention currency,83 i.e.,
that nations, in order to meet their obligation of maintaining parity
within the prescribed margin, will intervene in their exchange markets
primarily with dollars rather than with gold or other currencies; second,
as the primary reserve currency.3 4 While other currencies were freely
28. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. V, § 3.
29. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. V, § 3(d).
30. SNIDER, supra note 8, at 344.
31. Meier, supra note 1, at 248.
32. Id.; see also note 18 supra and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 249.
34. Id.
1972]
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convertible into dollars, dollars were freely convertible into gold. For this
reason nations accepted dollars as payment of deficits or other obligations.
In addition, while dollars were freely convertible and were thus as "good
as gold," they, unlike gold, could earn interest, and, as the supply of
dollars increased through interest or through United States deficits, the
amount of international reserves increased. These factors combined to
induce monetary authorities to hold surplus dollars in reserve to back-up
their own currencies and finance their own deficits rather than convert
them, as would be done with the surplus holdings of other currencies.
2. Results of the Dollar's Position
The practice of holding United States dollars as a reserve asset has
several effects upon both the United States and other IMF member-
nations.
First, there is some loss of internal control over the exchange rate. As
nations continue to hold dollars as reserve assets, and as the supply of
dollars increases world-wide, world reserves continue to grow. In fact,
the increased supply of dollars accounts for nearly half of the increase
in world-wide reserves since 1950.35 It is thus considered generally un-
desirable for the United States to devalue the par-value of the dollar;
such an act would decrease world reserves z6 In addition, a devaluation
of the dollar might entail a chain reaction of devaluation of the par-values
of other currencies, as all currencies are, by agreement, pegged to the dol-
lar.
Second, the value of the dollar as a reserve asset and the facility with
which it may be used as the major intervention currency tend to discour-
35. "Reserves held in the form of gold actually declined over the years 1964-1969.
More than half the increase of reserves in the period was due to drawings... from the
Fund; these involve an increase in repayment commitments by the countries making the
drawings, and do not constitute a long-term addition to net world reserves. The increased
holdings of dollar balances constituted the other major source of reserve holdings."
While world reserves increased in total from $48.8 billion in 1950 to $76.3 billion in
1968, the amount of officially held dollars rose from $4.9 billion to $17.5 billion over the
same period. Meier, supra note 1, at 249 nn. 49 & 50.
36. An 8.57 percent devaluation of the dollar has already occurred as a result of the
Smithsonian Agreements of December, 1971. The New Exchange Rates, 122 THE BANKER
10, 11 (Mar. 1972). This was a controlled devaluation, however, the result of international
agreement and not a unilateral action by the United States made with IMF approval.
"New strains are ... bound to show themselves as soon as a major change occurs in the
economic situation compared with that at the time of the [Smithsonian] discussions,
which is generally expected for the second half of 1972 ... and at the latest in the first
half of 1973." Kleps, On the Way to the Next Monetary Crisis, 4 INTErECONOMICS 107,
109 (Apr. 1972).
[Vol. 6:77
International Monetary Reform
age official holders of dollars from converting them into gold. As the
United States would convert gold held only by official holders, the con-
vertibility of the dollar and the maintenance of its par-value was rarely
put to the test. The United States also maintained its parity by freely
buying and selling gold, in accordance with the IMF Agreement. Since
defense of the dollar's parity is accomplished in the same way as defense
of the dollar's par-value, the United States is not often called upon to
maintain parity. Other nations, however, do not enjoy the same status.
Their parity is pegged to the dollar, and their par-value is expressed in
terms of gold or dollars. Thus, in maintaining their own parity they in-
directly maintain the par-value and parity of the dollar. For example,
private holders of dollars wishing to speculate could not demand con-
version into gold from the United States. They could, however, obtain
conversion into other currencies from nations whose currency is con-
vertible by selling dollars on the exchange markets. Were the demand for
other currencies to become so great as to threaten existing parity, nations
would be required to intervene with their reserves to defend their ex-
change rates. Thus, member-nations other than the United States would
in effect be defending the value of the dollar.
A final result of the position of the dollar as a reserve currency is that
it enables the United States to avoid using its assets to meet its balance
of payments deficits. To the United States the dollar is a domestic cur-
rency; to the member-nations, however, it is a reserve asset, and as such
it is freely acceptable to most nations. Thus, the United States can pur-
chase imports with its domestic currency without resort to exchange
market transactions, while at the same time it will have little fear that
its gold reserves will be drained through conversion of these dollars. If
the United States operates in an over-all balance of payments deficit, it
may finance this deficit through the simple expedient of printing more
dollars and transferring them to the appropriate nation's account. Of
course, unless United States gold reserves increase along with the amount
of dollars, the amount of liabilities will soon become greater than the
assets available. In addition, as the supply of dollars increases, the confi-
dence in the ability of the United States to convert decreases, thereby
weakening the entire monetary system.37 Were this to happen, member-
57. It was partially to forestall such a situation that the United States ceased con-
verting gold in August, 1971. This has not solved the problem, but only put it off. If
the United States is to meet IMF obligations, it must at some time reinitiate dollar con-
1972]
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nations could refuse to accept more dollars as payment. This would not
be in their own interest because if the deficit grew sufficiently large, the
foreign exchange reserves of the United States combined with its drawing
rights in the IMF might be unable to meet the amount of liabilities the
United States was required to convert. The United States would then be
forced to draw upon its gold reserves to meet the demand, resulting in a
diminishing amount of reserves to support its outstanding currency. The
structure would collapse like a house of cards if other nations, fearing to
be the last to cash in on dwindling United States reserves, followed suit.
An entire disintegration of the international monetary system could re-
sult.
3. Past Attempts at Reform
The International Monetary Fund attempted to ease these problems in
1968 with the introduction of Special Drawing Rights (SDR).88 SDR's
are an artificially created reserve asset allocated to member-nations who
wish to participate. Allocation of SDR's is in proportion to each member-
nation's quota, and they are characterized by an obligation on the part
of all participating member-nations to freely accept them up to twice
each nation's net cumulative allocation. 9 SDR transactions are normally
accomplished through the "designation" mechanism.40 A country wishing
to use its SDR's to obtain foreign exchange necessary for its balance of
payments or for reserves will simply inform the IMF. The IMF in turn
will designate one or more participating member-nations, usually those in
surplus, to accept the SDR's and provide the desired foreign exchange. 41
vertibility. One aim of a reformed system is to enable this without a corresponding
"run" on the dollar.
38. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Arts. XXI to XXXII. The Executive Directors point
out that, "[t]he first decision to allocate SDR's was predicated on the assumption that
the earlier process of reserve creation had substantially come to an end. The magnitude
of the reserve creation in the form of reserve currencies in 1970 and 1971 showed, how-
ever, that no mechanism existed to ensure that the external deficit of the United States
and the accumulation of dollars would diminish. Indeed, both assumed unprecedented
proportions in 1970 and 1971 under the influence of exchange rate misalignment and
massive capital outflows." Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 6.
39. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXV, § 4.
"A participant's net cumulative allocation is the total of special drawing rights allo-
cated to it minus the special drawing rights allocated to it that have been cancelled. If
there are no cancellations, net cumulative allocations will be simply the total number
of units allocated to each participant." Gold, A Comparison of Special Drawing Rights
and Gold As Reserve Assets, 2 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 326, 342 (1970).
40. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXV, § 5.
41. "The is a legal obligation on the country designated not only to supply foreign
exchange for SDR's, but to supply one of eight currencies classified by the Fund as
'convertible in fact': the U.S. dollar, British sterling and French franc in the first cate-
gory-being convertible into each other-and the Belgian franc, German mark, Italian
[Vol. 6:77
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The most important point about SDR's is that they permit nations to
build up reserves of foreign exchange without any other nation going
into deficit. Although they approach a form of reserve creation, SDR's
are essentially a method of temporarily accumulating foreign exchange
reserves. In effect, the purpose they serve is to increase the drawing rights
of members through an increase in quotas without the corresponding
requirement of allotting to the IMF twenty-five per cent of the quota in-
crease in gold. Further, SDR's do not require any currency payment on
the part of the drawing nation as in the case of normal drawing rights.
Participating member-nations are thereby able to accumulate foreign ex-
change when necessary without any drain on their existing reserve assets.
The obligation to "reconstitute" 42 SDR's, however, points out the fact
that SDR's are not an entirely obligation-free form of reserves. Although
nations are free to use their entire allocations of SDR's, reconstitution
requires over time the maintenance of a minimum average balance of
SDR's. Present requirements are that a member's average SDR balance
over five years does not fall below thirty per cent of its net cumulative
allocation. In this sense, SDR's are merely a form of credit extended to
participating nations; careful use of SDR's by the participants, however,
avoids the reconstitution requirement and makes SDR's more in the
nature of created reserves.
The basic reform idea behind SDR's was that they would offer partici-
pating member-nations an alternative to dollar holdings for reserve pur-
poses. Although widely used, SDR's have failed to accomplish this goal.
Dollar holdings have continued to mushroom, and the problems associ-
ated with such holdings have worsened.43
II
THE APPROACH AND IMPACT OF THE REPORT TO THE
PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM
The Executive Directors in their Report have taken a fresh approach
to the problems facing the international monetary system and are in the
lire, the Netherlands guilder and Mexican peso in the second category-being conver-
tible directly into U.S. dollars only." MENDFLSOHN, supra note 11, at 8.
42. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXV, § 6.
43. SDR's have not "failed" in any sense. Rather, they were introduced into the inter-
national monetary system at a time when various factors united to cause an unprece-
dented increase in world reserves, particularly in the form of foreign exchange. The
vast increases of foreign exchange holdings have minimized the impact SDR's might
otherwise have had on dollar holdings. The various factors causing this increase are
discussed in IMF, 1971 ANNAL REPORT, 21-32.
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process of formulating a comprehensive scheme aimed at a solution to
all of the causes of the present difficulties.44
The Directors recognize that their Report is ... necessarily prelimi-
nary in character.. ."45 due to the difficulty of foreseeing which possible
course for development of the international monetary system ".. . would
best accomodate the diverse positions and interests of member countries,
while safeguarding the global character of the system and minimizing
the risk of any retreat into protectionism and inward-looking blocks."40
They declare, however, that there has been much progress in identifying
and examining major issues for further study in negotiation.47
The Directors clearly recognize that the basic problems stem from the
large imbalance of trade and payments. More specifically, they consider
several factors which have seriously impeded the operation of the system
in the achievement of its stated goals; these are: 1) the inflexibility of the
exchange rates of members, a problem common to all IMF member-
nations but which has recently arisen ".. . in acute form in the case of
the U.S. dollar.. .";48 2) the lack of a reserve asset (e.g., gold or currency)
which is sufficiently liquid to accommodate the rapidly fluctuating de-
mands of modern world trade and finance; and 3) the protectionist domes-
tic policies of member-nations.49
Approaching these problems within the context of the stated goals of
the IMF as expressed in its Articles of Agreement, the Directors state:
In general terms, the avoidance or elimination of the difficulties that impeded
the system in the past and the achievement of the aims mentioned . . . will
depend on the adoption of improved arrangements for the aditustment and
settlement of payments imbalances. The essence of an efficient adjustment
44. "The elements of the international monetary system that are considered in these
separate chapters are closely interrelated. Thus, for example, decisions relating to any
new arrangements for the settlement of payments imbalances would depend heavily on
the working... of the adjustment process, in particular the exchange rate mechanism.
Similarly a system involving greater exchange rate flexibility for all currencies ... might
tend to both diminish the need for reserves and the role of reserve currencies. The
future role of reserve currencies, together with other reserve assets, would also to some
extent be determined by any settlement arrangements that were adopted." Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 11.
46. Id.
47. The Report on Reform, supra note 7, is divided into six chapters. After discussing
the need for reform in Chapter 1, the Directors address the specific difficulties of the
exchange rate mechanism (Chapter II), convertibility and settlement of imbalances
(Chapter III), and the roles of various assets in reserves (Chapter IV). It is on these
aspects of the Report that this comment focuses. The two remaining chapters of the
Report, dealing with the problems of disequilibrating capital movements, in Chapter V,
and reform and the developing countries, in Chapter VI, are not discussed here.
48. Id. at 5.
49. It is these policies which, the Directors state,"... [have] made balance of pay-
ments adjustment more difficult." Id. at 6.
[Vol. 6:77
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mechanism is that countries refrain from policies that are likely to lead to
severe balance of payments disequilibria and take early action to correct such
disequilibria as nevertheless occur.... Attempts should also be made to find
clearer criteria for allocating responsibilities for initiating adjustment among
countries in different balance of payment situations. In addition, settlement
arrangements for all countries should be such as to promote the objective of
the adjustment process.50
This summary is essential background to an understanding of the
Directors' endorsement or rejection of various alternatives for dealing
with each of the principal problems in international monetary reform.
A. TiE EXCHANGE RATE MECHANISM
"The exchange rate mechanism plays a major role in the adjustment
process, and the unsatisfactory functioning of this mechanism was an
important factor in the weakness of the process .... 51. This mechanism
has recently been the subject of a great amount of analysis, and several
reform proposals have come to the fore.52 In 1970 the Executive Directors
submitted a report entitled "The Role of Exchange Rates in the Adjust-
ment of International Payments."53 In that report the Directors exten-
sively reviewed the exchange rate mechanism, with particular attention
devoted to current proposals. The conclusion of the 1970 report was:
... that the par value system was the most appropriate general exchange rate
regime but that acceptance of this conclusion carried with it an obligation on
all parties to make the system as effective as possible. . . . The Executive
Directors suggested that, in certain cases, prompter and smaller adjustments in
members' par values would help to avoid the building up of large disequilibria
and the eventual recourse to larger adjustments.54
Thus, the Directors merely called for more cooperation within the
already-existing framework.
The experience of 1970 is not the experience of 1972, however, and
basic attitudes have altered. The developments since 1970 have injected
new elements into discussion and evaluation of the exchange rate mecha-
nism.5 5
50. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 11.
52. See, e.g., Legal Problems, supra note 12; Meier, supra note 1. For a review of
various reform plans, see F. MAcHLup, PLANS FOR REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY S s T (1964).
53. IMF, The Role of Exchange Rates in the Adjustment of International Payments:
A Report by the Executive Directors (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Report]; see also
Polasek, The Role of Exchange Rates In International Adjustment: the IMF Report and
Beyond, 47 ECON. Ran. 338 (1971).
54. Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 11.
55. "The widespread recourse to floating rates after August 1971 showed that.., the
1972]
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In the face of the difficulties in the present system, the Directors now
call for a "... fresh approach... which will accord to the United States,
as well as to other nations, a due measure of initiative in the effective
exercise of exchange rate flexibility."56 The Directors now accept that
"[s]ince... the exchange rate of each currency is-to a larger or smaller
extent-a matter of concern to all members, it is unavoidable that some
judgment as to appropriate rates be made by the international commu-
nity in accordance with the best techniques available." 57
1. The "Crawling Peg" Method
One of the modifications considered in the 1970 Report was the "crawl-
ing peg"5 8 method of adjustment. Under this proposal exchange rates
would, on the whole, remain stable, with adjustments made in small au-
tomatic steps according to a predetermined formula. The formula would
be geared to objective criteria, such as shifts in the amount of a member-
state's official reserves, changes in the spot of exchange of a mem-
ber-state's currency, or, even, changes in relative price indices between
different countries. These objective criteria, taken either together or
separately, would indicate when adjustment would be necessary, and
how large it should be. The adjustment itself might be discretionary
with the member-nation or could even be provided for automatically
through the IMF.5 9
The "crawling peg," its proponents argue, would provide both the de-
sired stability and flexibility in exchange rates. The objections noted by
the 1970 Report were that objective indicators may reflect only short-term
features of the balance of payments, rather than the development of un-
derlying structural disequilibria; restrictive domestic monetary policies
system as previously operated was subject to pressures beyond its power to handle, and
underlines the urgency of making it less crisis prone. Two inferences may be drawn from
this experience. First, protracted uncertainties about future exchange rate relationships
may unfavorably affect the general economic climate .... Second, floating rates (like
fixed rates) require some means of reconciling countries' interests and avoiding con-
flicting policies, and it is virtually impossible to negotiate the necessary arrangements at
short notice under the impact of sudden shocks to the system." Id.; see also note 80 infra.
56. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
58. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this mechanism, see Bach,
Problems of the International Monetary System and Proposals for Reform-1944-1970,
51 FED. Ras. ST. Louis 24 (1972).
59. Id. at 30-31. Recall that the IMF does not presently have such power; par-value
changes are made only upon a member-nation's request, which will be granted only if
that member suffers "fundamental disequilibrium." See notes 19 & 20 supra and accom-
panying text.
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of members might prevent such disequilibria from being reflected in the
relevant data.60
Now, however, the Directors suggest that, in light of the additional
experience gained by the IMF in guiding exchange rate adjustment in
recent years, it may be possible to establish objective criteria to provide
a continuous and accurate review of exchange rates.61 Thus, any reformed
monetary system is likely to incorporate the major features of the "crawl-
ing peg" system. Such a mechanism provides for an allocation of re-
sponsibility between member-nations and the IMF, and allows for a due
measure of initiative for change resting with individual members.
This would expand the present role of the IMF as consultant and co-
ordinator for member-nations on international monetary policy; the IMF
would hold some power, power to bring about necessary changes in
exchange rates. 62 Pointing out that the persent Articles of the IMF are
inadequate to meet this purpose,63 the Directors also recognize that levy-
ing any form of sanctions against recalcitrant members is an extremely
complex issue. Notwithstanding the obstacles,64 the Report asserts that
.... the importance to the system of having at its disposal some form
60. See Polasek, supra note 53, at 341.
61. The report acknowledges that "[s]ome consider ... that the influence and initia-
tive of the Fund should continue to be exercised principally through analysis and per-
suasion. In their view, the initiative of the Fund has to be cautiously exercised and
should normally be addressed to the need for balance of payments adjustment, as far as
possible leaving the choice of instruments, including proposals for par value changes, to
members themselves.... [Others] consider that surveillance of exchange rates would
work more satisfactorily if it encompassed certain initiatives by the Fund with respect
to par value changes that it considered to be required. To some extent there has always
been informal activity in this direction, and it may be possible and desirable to extend
this practice." Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 17.
62. "Ultimately decisive for the effectiveness of the monetary reform is a successive
coordination'of national economic policies on the foundation of universal monetary
discipline .. " Kleps, supra note 36, at 110.
63. Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 18; the Directors are referring to Art. VII,§§ 1 and 3 and Art. XII, § 8, IMF Articles, supra note 2.
64. "One question is how definite the rules inscribed in the Articles would have to be,
and how precisely the circumstances of their application would have to be delineated, in
order to warrant the application of measures or procedures that might be regarded as
penalizing a member that had defaulted in performing its obligation or whose balance
of payments policies conflicted with criteria that had been internationally agreed.... It
would also be for consideration whether any such measures or procedures should involve
progressively firmer pressures on a member that failed to respond. Other questions that
arse are, first, whether members would be willing to take decisions in the Fund ... to
bring pressure to bear on a particular member; second, whether members would be
willing to take the action enjoined, or permitted by any decisions that were adopted;
and, third, whether it would be desirable or possible to design procedures under which
rules, once agreed, could to a large extent apply without the exercise of further discre-
tion." Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 18.
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of collective leverage is such that the subject deserves study and con-
sideration." 5
2. Stable Parity with Wider Margins
Another reform proposal considered by the 1970 Report was the
recommendation for stable parity with wider margins.06 Under this plan,
the IMF Articles would be modified to allow an exchange rate to vary
within, for example, five per cent, on either side of parity, instead of the
restrictive one per cent variation now permitted.67 Unlike a freely-flexible
exchange rate proposal,68 however, wider margins would not render the
need for reserves obsolete, because member-nations would still be re-
quired to intervene whenever the rates threatened to pass the upper or
lower limits of the margin. Such a system would, nevertheless, allow for
the minor adjustments in parity necessary to reflect changes in relative
costs and prices vis--vis a nation's principal trading partner. The re-
quired intervention at marginal limits to prevent very large changes in
parity would, at the same time, ensure the confidence and stability nec-
essary to long-term growth.
Other advantages to this system are: first, increasing the permissible
rate fluctuation would facilitate equilibrating short-term capital flows
while discouraging disequilibrating flows, assuming continued confidence
in the existing parity; second, by reducing the reliability of exchange rates
within the wider margins, this system would reduce the sensitivity of
short-term capital flows to variations in domestic monetary policy; third,
this in turn would inhibit currency speculation.6 9
In the 1970 Report, the Directors set aside this proposal as inconsistent
with the par-value system because:
... countries would find their competitive positions subjected to sudden and
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 58.
67. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. IV, § 3.
68. See notes 75-79 infra and accompanying text.
69. Short-term capital is mainly currency which flows into a nation for purposes of
investment, and is particularly responsive to domestic monetary policies. If, for example,
the United States Federal Reserve were to raise domestic interest rates, foreign investors
might likely respond by purchasing dollars on the exchange markets for short-term
American investment. The more capital thus attracted, the more upward pressure on
the exchange rate would result. If the interest rate in the United States were 5 per cent,
investors could be assured of a 4 per cent gain less costs because the exchange rate
would rise by no more than one per cent under the present system. If exchange rates
were permitted to fluctuate to a greater degree, pressure on the rate caused by the
investors' demand for dollars might cause a 3 or 4 per cent increase in the exchange
rate. Gains in this case would be much lower for investors. In this way, wider margins
would "desensitize" short-term capital flows to utional monetary policies.
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inappropriate changes as a result of temporary market developments or of
administrative actions of other countries through official intervention in ex-
change markets.70
Furthermore, wider margins might prove disadvantageous to the develop-
ing nations, which might wish to encourage short-term capital inflows.
A system which desensitized such flows might make it difficult for these
nations to attract capital through their domestic monetary policies.
The Report adopts a less cautious attitude toward wider margins
around parity. Noting that since the Smithsonian Agreements of Decem-
ber 18, 1971,71 wider margins have been increasingly used on a temporary
basis, the Directors state: "It is now for consideration whether wider mar-
gins should become a permanent feature of the par value system... and
how wide such margins should be .... 72 Further consideration would be
given to the possibility of IMF authorization of wider margins for certain
member-nations, while at the same time maintaining narrower margins
for others, with power in the IMF to withdraw permission to maintain
the designated margin3 Thus, it appears likely that the concept of wider
margins will be incorporated into a compromise solution providing wider
IMF-controlled margins for the industrial nations, and narrower margins
for the developing nations.7 4
3. Floating Exchange Rates
A third reform considered in the 1970 Report was the prosposal for
freely-fluctuating or floating exchange rates 5 The adoption of such a
70. 1970 Report, supra note 53, at 43.
71. The Smithsonian Agreements are reported in The New Exchange Rates, supra
note 36; Reierson, What Happened at Washington, 122 BANKER 10 (Jan. 1972).
In describing the Smithsonian Agreement the Directors report; ". . . [t]he Executive
Directors adopted a decision establishing a temporary regime under which a member
might permit the exchange rates for its currency to move within margins of 2 per cent
on either side of the established relationship of its currency to its intervention currency.
The decision also provided that a member that takes appropriate measures to maintain
the exchange rates for its currency within the margins of 214 per cent in terms of its
intervention currency may also permit the resulting exchange rates for its currency in
terms of other currencies to fluctuate within margins of not more than 41 per cent
of the relationship based on their relative par values or central rates, with further
margins of 1 per cent each way in certain circumstances." Report on Reform, supra
note 7, at 19.
72. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
73. Id. It is also for consideration . . . whether alternatively, the Fund might be
authorized to permit wider margins in certain circumstances whether for currencies
generally or in particular cases; and whether any such authority should be exercised on
the basis of a decision taken by some specified majority and should include the right to
withdraw any permission given under it." Id.
74. The Directors point out, however, that they have not "... reached a common
view as to an appropriate regime of margins which might succeed the present temporary
arrangements." Id. at 20.
75. See, e.g., R. TiREN, GOLD AND THE DoLLAR CRms 82 et seq. (1960). For arguments
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system would eliminate the need for reserve assets; since exchange rates
would be subject solely to the free market forces of supply and demand,
there would be no need for government intervention to maintain any
particular parity. Market forces would cause the exchange rate to vary
until a deficit or surplus were removed.7 6 The major argument in favor
of a freely-fluctuating exchange rate is that fluctuations would automati-
cally "... offset the impact of disparate national policies upon the inter-
national pattern of prices and costs . . ."77 and would in this manner
preserve ". . . long run balance in each country's international transac-
tions without recourse to trade or exchange restrictions, and without any
interference with each country's freedom to pursue whatever internal
monetary and credit policies it chooses."1 8
The sine qua non of such a system, however, is a free exchange market,
devoid of governmental influence. This is unlikely because of the impact
which movements in the rate of exchange have on domestic economies,
and the time required for natural adjustment.1 9
The present Report reopens the question of a floating exchange rate
in view of the many countries which turned to this solution during the
monetary crisis of 1971.80 Specifically, the Directors note that ". , . the
granting of legal authority to the Fund to approve temporary deviation
under an express power to approve, subject to conditions, [and to revoke
the deviations when no longer necessary] might enable the Fund to deal
more effectively with [such situations.]" 81
B. CONVERTIBILITY AND SETrLEMENT OF IMBALANCES
The question of convertibility and the settlement of imbalances refers
particularly, although not solely, to the United States. The unique posi-
strongly in favor of flexible exchange rates, see Watts, The Purpose of Fixed Parities, 8
EurOMONEY 28 (Dec. 1971); but see Bareau, Back to Bancors, 3 EUtOMONEY 18 (Nov.
1971).
76. See, e.g., SNma, supra note 8, at 303 et seq.
77. TRIFFIN, supra note 75.
78. Id.
79. In the Directors' words, this proposal was set aside because of the belief that
.. national authorities could not be expected in modem conditions to adopt a policy
of neutrality with respect to movements in an economic variable of such importance to
the domestic economy as the rate of exchange, with its effect on prices, incomes, employ-
ment, and the structure of industry as between domestic and foreign sectors." 1970
Report, supra note 53, at 42.
80. Between May 9, 1971, and the Smithsonian Agreements of December 18, 1971, the
Canadian dollar, German mark, Belgian franc and Dutch guilder were "floating." Kleps,
supra note 62, at 107.
81. Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 21.
[Vol. 6: 77
International Monetary Reform
tion of the United States dollar in the present international monetary
system is one of the major reasons there is need for reform. The problem
extends beyond the power of any single nation; proper solution requires
an international effort coordinated through the IMF.
As previously noted, the unique position of the United States dollar
has had three major effects: 1) diminished control by the United States
over its exchange rate; 2) maintenance of the dollar's value by nations
other than the United States; and 3) the financing of United States deficits
by increasing outstanding dollar liabilities,8 2 Compounding these prob-
lems is the fact that the competitive trade position of the United States
in the world market has deteriorated due to structural changes in world-
wide prices and costs.s3 As the United States trade position weakens, the
need for exchange adjustment becomes more critical because United
States imbalances stem from a fundamental disequilibrium.8 4 The rigidity
of the present exchange mechanism and the present undesirability of
dollar devaluationS5 however, have combined to resist the necessary ad-
justment. Thus, the United States faces the prospect of a continuing and
growing deficit, which can only lessen confidence in, and attractiveness of,
the dollar to its official holders. The result may eventually be a demand
for conversion of the dollar which the United States cannot satisfy.86
1. The Approach of the Report
Because the difficulties involved with the United States dollar have
been partially caused by the problems of the exchange rate mechanism
and the stock of reserves, while at the same time partially exacerbating
these problems, the Directors take the position that any reform ". ..
should differ in some major respects from the position that prevailed with
respect to the U.S. dollar prior to August 15, 1971 [when the convertibility
of the dollar into gold was suspended]."87 Although the focus has been on
the United States dollar, the Report states that official holdings of sub-
82. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
83. The United States balance of trade-the measure of exports vis-a-vis imports-
had fallen from a $7.1 billion surplus in 1964 to a $1.4 billion deficit in August, 1971.
What to Expect Next in the World's Money Crisis, U.S. NEWS AND WoRLD REPORT, Oct.
11, 1971, at 89.
84. The Directors state that the system of creating reserve assets at the expense of all
parties involved is based on structural imbalances "of a size that could not be main-
tained by either side." Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 23.
85. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
86. IMF, 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 21-23, 147-48.
87. Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 23-24.
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sidiary reserve currencies may also be substantial, and could lead to simi-
lar problems in the future. "Consequently, the question of appropriate
convertibility and settlement arrangements arises also with respect to the
secondary reserve centers."88 The Directors also maintain a cautious ap-
proach by pointing out that the question of settlement arrangements
must be attuned not only to the needs of the reserve centers, but also to
the needs and interests of those member-nations which are not reserve
centers.89
2. Conditions of Successful Reform
The Report specifies three conditions precedent to any form of asset
settlement: 1) an adequate improvement in the reserve position of the
United States, which might come from changes in the balance of pay-
ments, SDR allocations, or long-term currency loans from other nations;
2) ".... a more effective [exchange rate] adjustment mechanism involving
all members and [including] a readiness on the part of other members to
accept changes in the ... exchange rate of the U.S. dollar .... -;00 and 3)
suitable arrangements regarding temporary imbalances, particularly those
arising from short-term capital flows.
3. Proposals for Asset Settlement
The Directors have, save for a passing reference,91 assumed that any
future reform must necessarily include a plan for asset settlement, and
have approached the question of dealing with reserve center nations
solely in terms of conditions, timing9 2 and methods. Although the meth-
ods must satisfy the conditions, the Directors compare each proposed
88. Id. at 23.
89. "Any asset settlement arrangement that was adopted would have to be geared not
only to the achievement of the other objectives discussed earlier, but also, as far as
possible, to the direct interests of members other than the reserve centers." Id. at 26.
90. Id. at 25.
91. The Directors note without enthusiasm that by one view the reserve centers, par-
ticularly the United States, would not be required to settle holdings accumulated in the
past, while a second view questions any asset settlement arrangement on the bases of
techlcal difficulties, ability of reserve centers to undertake such arrangements, and the
lack of a.precedent for such a scheme. Id. at 24.
92. Due to the uncertainties of timing and magnitude involved in these factors, the
Directors suggest the possibility of moving toward full asset settlement in phases. "This
would offer an earlier contribution to the objectives ... than if the transition from the
present situation to full asset settlement were to be delayed until it could be made in
one jump-but the contribution would . .. only be partial." Such phases, the Report
states, might involve proportioned settlement of the U.S. deficits, or settlement up to a
specified amount. Id. at 26.
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arrangement according to its ability to achieve full asset settlement and
its consideration of member-nations' preferences in asset composition. 93
a. Total balance conversion
The first asset settlement arrangement proposed would require reserve
centers to convert an amount equivalent to any net increases in the bal-
ances of its currency held by other nations. For example, if dollar balances
held by member-nations totaled $10 billion when this arrangement went
into effect, any net increase above this limit would have to be converted
by the United States through its reserve assets. If the total balances of
official holdings rose to $1 1 billion, the United States would be required
to use its reserve assets of gold, SDR's, drawing rights, or foreign curren-
cies to convert one billion dollars. The nations which would have to
accept these United States reserves in return for their dollars, and the
amounts they would have to accept, would be determined by the IMF
through a procedure analogous to the present SDR designation method.94
If the reserve center were in surplus, the net amount of its outstanding
currency having decreased from $10 billion to $9 billion because member-
nations had used their dollar holdings to purchase exports from the
United States, the $1 billion which flowed into the United States would,
in turn, be used to purchase SDR's from a special facility created by the
IMF for such a purpose. These excess SDR's would then be used to con-
vert additional dollars held by member-nations as reserves, thus further
decreasing the amount of dollars outstanding to $8 billion. This second
influx of dollars to the United States could not be converted into SDR's
because the facility would be empowered to sell SDR's to reserve centers
only in an amount equivalent to the original net decrease of the official
holdings of their currencies by member-nations.9 5 If the reserve center
surplus is manifested by an inflow of currency other than that of the
93. "[MIn a situation in which countries continue to hold substantial amounts of cur-
rencies in their reserves, it would be necessary to consider how far account could be
taken of differences of preference in asset composition. These differences to some extent
reflect institutional factors, but they also reflect the concern that some countries would
feel at any loss of any income entailed in holding reserves in the form of SDR's instead
of reserve currencies, the differing degrees of confidence felt in different assets, and the
desire to maintain flexibility and spread risks." Id. at 26.
94. See notes 40 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
95. "The objective that reserve centers should earn reserve assets when in surplus
would be realized in part by channeling to these centers any SDR's that other countries
wanted to use, e.g., by the SDR designation mechanism." Report on Reform, supra
note 7, at 27.
1972]
Cornell International Law Journal
reserve center, this foreign exchange would be used for direct conversion
without recourse to an SDR facility.
This approach would eventually lead to full asset settlement. It would
accommodate the individual preferences of member-nations for a specific
composition of their reserve assets, however, only to the extent that this
could be done through the designation mechanism.
b. Individual net balance conversion
Under the second proposal for asset settlement, member-nations would
agree not to let their total holdings of each reserve currency diverge from
a previously specified level. Any holdings of a reserve currency above this
level would be presented to reserve centers, which would be required
to convert them with their own reserve assets of gold, SDR's or currencies
other than their own. If holdings fell below the specified level, countries
would reconstitute their balances by purchasing the reserve currency
from the reserve center with their own currency or reserve assets.
A variation of this approach would specify only an upper limit, and
.. rely on a substitution facility similar to that described [supra,
subpara. (a) and infra subpara. (c)] to ensure asset financing of reserve
center surpluses."96 Full asset settlement would be accomplished accord-
ing to the original amount of the reserve center currency to be left out-
standing as originally agreed upon. Different asset preferences, however,
could be accommodated only insofar as member-nations were able to spec-
ify their own amounts of reserve center currency holdings at the outset,
unless the original levels agreed upon by each member could be modified
at a later date.
c. IMF conversion
The third approach would achieve asset settlement directly through the
IMF. A reserve substitution facility similar to that mentioned above
would be established to create and sell SDR's. Member-nations with hold-
ings of reserve currencies would be able to present them to the facility at
any time in return for SDR's. If a reserve center were in deficit it could,
but would not be required to, convert its currency by buying from the
facility, in exchange for its reserves of gold, SDR's, or other currencies,
an amount of its currency equivalent to the net increase in its liabilities
96. Id.
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outstanding. Thus conversion would take place directly through the IMF.
Nations whose holdings of reserve center currencies increase will pre-
sumably sell the net increase to the IMF in return for SDR's. This amount
of reserve center currency would then be converted by the IMF through
repurchase by the reserve center country. This method relies heavily on a
reserve center's desire to decrease its liabilities even when in deficit, as the
entire arrangement is voluntary. It is the most flexible method, however,
permitting member-nations to maintain reserve center currencies as long
as they desire and in any amount they prefer, while at the same time not
requiring reserve centers to convert while in deficit. In this way, should
member-nations lose confidence in a particular reserve center currency,
the entire amount outstanding could be converted at the existing rate of
exchange for SDR's without fear of depleting the reserve center's assets or
of devaluation. When reserve centers were in surplus, however, asset
settlement would proceed through the IMF facility as earlier described.
Although the Directors express no preference for any of these three
proposals, it is noteworthy that these are the only methods presented and
that each calls for a greatly expanded role of SDR's.
C. THE ROLES OF VAluous AsSETs IN RESERVES
1. The Role of Reserve Center Currencies.
The major source of reserve creation today is through the accumulation
of reserve center currencies, particularly the United States dollar.97 If an
asset settlement arrangement were adopted, then this method of reserve
creation would be lost. In any of the three proposed methods for accom-
plishing asset settlement, the relative role of currencies would decline over
time. This role would be taken over by SDR's; each method of asset settle-
ment required as a minimum the creation of a reserve substitution facility
empowered to create and sell reserve assets.9 8 The extent of recourse avail-
able to member-nations to such a facility would depend upon the method
97. See note 4S supra.
98. "The necessary qualities of the reserve asset that would be needed for this purpose
would be effectively the same as those of the SDR, and it would thus appear natural to
use SDR's.... The substitution of newly created SDR's for reserve currency holdings
... would require the establishment of a supplementary facility in the Fund." This
facility the Directors label, for present purposes, the "Substitution account." Report on
Reform, supra note 7, at 1-32. Plans for an expanded use of SDR's are by no means
new, and encompass a larger area than that dealt with here. See, e.g., Barattieri, An
Expanded Role for SDR's, 4 EUROMONEY 12 (Mar. 1972); Fleming. The SDR: Some
Problems and Possibilities, 18 IMF STmr Pju'ms 25 (1972).
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of asset settlement adopted.99 The operations of the substitution facility,
however, would follow the general guidelines described in the methods of
asset settlement. 100 For example, reserve centers could sell, in return for
SDR's, an amount of their own currency equal to any decline in their out-
standing liabilities. Nations holding reserve center currencies might also
be entitled to sell their currency holdings for SDR's through the facility.
The Report also points out that the substitution account might be
adopted to permit countries to acquire reserve currencies in exchange for
SDR's.101
There are, however, several objections to the establishment of a substi-
tution facility empowered to create, buy and sell SDR's. Under two of the
proposed methods, for example, recourse to the facility would be enjoyed
mainly by reserve center nations. Non-reserve center nations might com-
plain that this unduly favored reserve centers at their expense by replacing
highly liquid reserve center currencies with less liquid SDR's, while return-
ing the currencies to the hands of reserve centers for further use.102 For ex-
ample, non-reserve centers would be deprived of the use of surplus dollars
as a means of intervention in the exchange market, but the United States
would theoretically still be able to use dollars to finance its deficits. On
the other hand, reserve centers might complain that under the third pro-
posal voluntary exchange by non-reserve centers through the facility
might result either in no change in their outstanding liabilities if non-
reserve centers continued to hold reserve currencies, or, conversely, in a
vast increase in the acceptance obligations of reserve centers, which is
simply another form of liability.1°3 Further, the Report points out such
99. Recall that the first and second methods proposed envisioned use of the substitu-
tion facility by reserve centers only, and in certain amounts; the third method envi-
sioned voluntary recourse for all member-nations, particularly non-reserve centers, for
exchange of unspecified balances of reserve currencies into SDR's.
100. See notes 91-96 supra and accompanying text.
101. "It might be convenient ... for the account to be able to operate in both direc-
tions, i.e., buying as well as selling SDR's in exchange for currencies. It could, to a large
extent, take the place of the designation mechanism. Report on Reform, supra
note 7, at 32.
102. "By 'international liquidity' is meant the aggregate stock of assets held by the
national monetary authority that is unconditionally available to settle the country's
imbalance in international transactions. At present, these international reserve assets
consist of monetary gold, official foreign exchange holdings (mainly the U.S. dollar and
pound sterling as reserve currencies), a member country's unconditional drawing rights
at the IMF, and ... Special Drawing Rights." Meier, supra note 1, at 248. SDR's are
to be used only for transactions with participants to obtain currency (Art. XXV); no
authorization is granted for use as direct payment of loans, for grants, or other like
transactions. SDR liquidity is thereby hampered to some degree.
103. The SDR acceptance obligation is the requirement that a participating member-
[Vol. 6:77
International Monetary Reform
an expansion of SDR's might put a strain on their present transferability
and acceptability. 104
2. An Expanded Role for SDR's
The proposed use of SDR's as a main reserve instrument rather than as
a marginal supplement to other reserve assets requires, as the Directors
recognize, a reconsideration of ".. . certain features of the SDR system in
the context of reform, in particular those bearing on the use and accep-
tance of the SDR and on its relative attraction as a reserve asset."'105 The
Report lists several factors which would have a direct bearing on the ex-
panded use and attractiveness of SDR's.
a. The acceptance obligation
Under the present system, each participant in the SDR plan, if desig-
nated by the IMF, is required to accept SDR's from other participants if
the acceptance of SDR's will not increase the transferee's total holdings
above 300 per cent of its net cumulative allocation.106 Modification of this
obligation, as proposed in the Report, would generally increase the
amount of SDR's which must be accepted by a participating member-
nation. Three methods of modification are suggested by the Report:x07
(i) The ratio of acceptance obligations to net cumulative allocations
(i.e., the 300 per cent requirement) could be increased to accommodate
SDR's which nations held through transactions with the substitution
facility rather than just those allocated to participants by the IMF. For
example, if the allocation of SDR's to Italy were $50 million, Italy's
present acceptance obligation is $150 million. If Italy acquired additional
SDR's through the substitution facility in the amount of $10 million, by
this proposal, the acceptance obligation would increase to $180 million.
(ii) The necessary acceptance obligations could be distributed among
nation, designated by the Fund, supply the requested currency to the drawing nation.
While SDR's are assets, the obligation to accept SDR's is a liability. The maximum
amount of the liability is go0 per cent of a nation's net cumulative allocation. See note
$9 supra and accompanying text.
104. "In this connection, it has to be borne in mind that any replacement of cur-
rency holdings by SDR's created for the purpose could require an assumption of addi-
tional acceptance obligations. The contribution of these ... would cause problems if,
as a result of the increased holding of SDR's in members' reserves, SDR's became a less
favored asset." Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 84.
105. Id. at 37.
106. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXV, § 4; see also note 39 supra,
107. Report on Reform, supra note 7, at 38.
1972]
Cornell International Law Journal
participants on the basis of some criteria other than net cumulative allo.
cations, such as subscription quotas.108 For example, if the ratio of accep-
tance obligations referred to the subscription quota of Italy, say, $100
million, Italy's acceptance obligation would be $300 million if the ratio
remained at 300 per cent.
(iii) Acceptance obligations could be completely abolished. When the
SDR has become established as the major reserve asset and its general
acceptance is assured by its use as the principal medium for official settle-
ment, exclusive reliance could be placed on the designation mechanism
to distribute SDR's among participating member-nations.
b. The substitution facility
The second major factor in the use and acceptance of SDR's involves a
lesser reliance on the delegation mechanism.1 9 The necessary degree of
reliance must depend, to a large extent, upon the final structure of the
substitution account. However, the more transactions a substitution
facility were to take part in, the less need there would be for designation;
nations unable to find a willing participant in SDR transactions could go
directly to the substitution facility rather than waiting for a participant
to be designated.
c. Satisfaction of IMF obligations
The increased role of SDR's envisions a diminishing role for reserve
currencies. At the present time, however, IMF repurchase obligations and
subscription quotas cannot be satisfied by SDR's, but only by foreign ex-
change or gold."10 The increased use and importance of SDR's might thus
necessitate a review of these requirements to permit satisfaction of IMF
obligations through SDR's.
d. Transactions outside the IMF
The use and attractiveness of SDR's might also be enhanced by per-
mitting member-nations to use them for loans or grants to less developed
nations, or for payment of debts between member-nations. Such trans-
actions are not permitted under the present IMF Articles,"' but amend-
108. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 40 & 41 supra and accompanying text.
110. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. III, § 3(b), (c); Art. V, § 7 (b); see also note 24
supra and accompanying text.
111. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXV.
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ment of the Articles to include such transactions will truly give SDR's the
aspect of an international currency.
e. Interest rate on SDR's12
The present interest rate of one and one-half per cent per annum is
considerably below the interest rate which can be earned on holdings of
reserve currencies such as dollars.113 A higher rate of interest would,
therefore, have a direct bearing on the attractiveness of SDR's compared
with other reserve currencies.
3. SDR's and Resenve Creation
At this point it is worth noting that although the Directors speak of
providing ".. . for needed increases in reserves through the SDR mecha-
nism,"11 4 the Report refers to the powers of the substitution facility to
create, sell or buy SDR's as limited to the net decrease of reserve center
liabilities, or net increases in other members' holdings of reserve cur-
rencies. It provides, that is, only for asset settlement, which is simply a
form of reserve substitution and not for reserve creation. Presumably,
members will, in a reformed system under IMF control, necessarily look
to the Board of Governors to provide for increases in world-wide reserves
through the existing framework." 5 If one of the better points of reserve
center currencies today is their ability to provide for world-wide increases
in reserves, inflationary though this may be in some cases, a reformed
system which provides for a decreasing use of reserve center currencies
must also fill the gaps left behind.
Possibly, the Directors have in mind an eventual liberalization of the
present restrictive mechanism for SDR creation. 1 6 If, for example, the
112. IT Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXVI, § 3. In the present system, "[t]he owner
of gold has no right to interest by virtue of holding gold, but the holder of special
drawing rights receives interest on them. The Fund pays interest, in special drawing
rights, to all holders at the same rate on their holdings of special drawing rights. Par-
ticipants pay charges, at the same rate as the rate of interest, on the net cumulative
allocation of special drawing rights to them .... It is obvious that a participant holding
more units than were allocated to it will receive a net amount of interest, and that a
participant holding fewer units than were allocated to it will pay a net amount of
charges." Gold, supra note 39, at 342.
113. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXVI, § 3.
114. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXIV, § 4. This Article reserves the powers of
allocation and cancellation of SDR's to the Board of Governors; Article XXVII forbids
delegation of these powers.
115. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Arts. XXI to XXXII.
116. The Directors also suggest a "broader and freer use" of SDR's. Report on Re-
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reconstitution obligations were cancelled, SDR creation might be more
equivalent to reserve creation. In addition, less stringent voting require-
ments might be considered in order to make SDR creation more
flexible."17
Another solution to which the Directors might be looking is the auto-
matic creation of reserves through the SDR interest rate, by which a
nation would receive an annual percentage increase of its SDR holdings,
and without the corresponding charges placed on SDR holdings. 118 Such
a plan, however, does not allow for direct control over reserve creation
except insofar as the IMF had control over increasing or decreasing the
SDR interest rate. Further, this plan may unduly favor the strong indus-
trial nations over the developing countries, as the latter are more likely
to have to use their SDR's while the former can accumulate them, thereby
depriving the most needy nations of the benefits of increased reserves.
4. The Role of Gold
The stress in the Report on a greatly increased role for SDR's in any
reformed international monetary system is indicative of the tendency on
the part of the Directors to seek the displacement of reserve currencies,
such as the United States dollar, as major reserve assets, and their replace-
ment with an internationally-controlled and supervised standard. The
need to remove the fluctuating influences of reserve currencies from the
system and put all nations on an equal footing has become obvious. The
Report's attitude toward the role of gold as a reserve in a reformed sys-
tem, however, is more cautious. The attitude of the Directors appears to
be that gold, although constituting nearly a third of international reserves
at the end of 1971, is likely to become relatively less important to the
international monetary system in the future due to the expanding role of
SDR's and other reserve assets which are more liquid and can draw in-
terest. However, positive action with reference to the elimination of gold
as a reserve asset is viewed by the Directors as inconsequential at best, and
somewhat dangerous at worst.119
form, supra note 7, at 39. "The present [SDR] mechanism is so complex that few have
really mastered all its intricacies." Barattieri, supra note 98, at 12.
117. IMF Articles, supra note 2, Art. XXIV, § 4(d); this Article requires a majority
of 85 per cent of the total voting power of the Board of Governors to approve SDR
allocations.
118. See note 112 supra.
119. "In the Articles, the value of a special drawing right is stated to be 0.888671
gram of fine gold, with intentionally no provision for a change in the equivalence.
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The Directors thus appear to favor a policy of patience and caution in
dealing with gold as a reserve asset in a reformed international monetary
system, and put their major emphasis on an expanded use of SDRs.120
Ill. RECENT REFORM DEVELOPMENTS
Concrete proposals for the reform of the international monetary system
have recently been offered at the 1972 annual meeting of the International
Monetary Fund in Washington, D.C.121 On September 26, 1972, Secretary
of the Treasury George P. Schultz, speaking on behalf of the United
States, presented proposals ". . . with far more detail than the United
States had offered before..." 122 Referring to the Report of the Executive
Directors, 123 and citing both the Smithsonian Agreements 124 and other
public and private sources, Secretary Schultz noted "... . certain principles
underlying monetary reform [which] already command widespread sup-
port.1 25 Within the framework of these principles, Secretary Schultz pro-
posed a more flexible international monetary system stressing a maximum
As a result, par values are de facto as firmly linked to SDR's as they are to gold and
any change in the value of gold in terms of currencies involves automatically a cor-
responding change in the value of the SDR in terms of currencies. Thus, a change in
the Articles which made the SDR the standard of par values-and which consequently
defined the value of gold in terms of SDR's rather than that of SDR's in terms of
gold-would derive importance only from its presentational effects, unless it were
accompanied by some loosening in the link between the two. The desirability of such
a loosening may, however, be questioned since it might add a new dimension of un-
certainty to the relative values of different reserve assets." Report on Reform, supra
note 2, at 34.
120. The Directors presumably view the future of gold in rather unfavorable terms.
Id. at 85.
121. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
122. Id.
123. In the words of Secretary Schultz: "As we enter into negotiations . . . ,we have
before us the useful report of the executive directors, identifying and clarifying some
of the basic issues which need to be resolved." Id. at 70, col. 2.
124. See note 71 supra.
125. N.Y. Times, supra note 121, at 70, col. 3.
"First is our mutual interest in encouraging freer trade in goods and services and the
flow of capital to the places where it can contribute most to economic growth. We
must avoid a breakup of the world into antagonistic blocs. We must not seek a refuge
from our problems behind walls of protectionism.
"A second fundamental is the need to develop a common code of conduct to protect
and strengthen the fabric of a free and open international economic order.
"Third, in shaping these rules we must recognize the need for clear disciplines and
standards of behavior to guide the international adjustment process--a crucial gap in
the Bretton Woods system.
"Fourth .... we can and should leave considerable flexibility to national governments
in their choice among adjustment instruments." Id. at 70, cols. 3, 4.
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amount of individual freedom for member-nations in choosing adjust-
ment policies to suit their needs and based upon a stronger role for the
IMF.126
A. EXCHANGE RATES
The proposals of the United States are based upon the assumption that
even in a reformed system most nations will resire to maintain a stable
par-value for their currencies, with the concomitant need for currency
convertibility. Within the system of fixed exchange rates, however, the
United States has proposed increased flexibility through the adoption of
several plans.
1. Wider Margins
The United States proposals view as essential to the future of a re-
formed monetary system the establishment of wider margins around par-
value which will be sufficient to ". . . dampen incentives for short-term
capital movements, and, when changes in [par-] values are desirable, to
ease the transition."'' 1 As the United States has based its proposals partly
upon the Smithsonian Agreements, 1 28 the size of the margins proposed
will presumably be those of the Agreements. The Agreements allow for a
margin of 2.25 per cent on either side of par-value. Thus the par-value of
the dollar may be expressed as "plus or minus 2.25 per cent of $38.00
equals one ounce of gold." Because other currencies are pegged to the par-
value of the dollar, however, foreign currencies are thereby permitted a
margin of 4.5 per cent on either side of par-value in terms of dollars, or a
total margin of 9 per cent, while the total margin for the dollar is only
4.5 per cent. It is unclear whether the newly-proposed margins would be
4.5 per cent or 9 per cent, but it is clear that the United States will require
that the total margins for the dollar be the same as that for all other
currencies. 129
126. "These suggestions are designed to provide stability without rigidity .... We
would strengthen the voice of the international community operating through the
IMF." Id. at 70, col. 3.
127. Id. at 70, col. 5.
128. See note 71 supra.
129. "Building on the [Smithsonian] approach in the context of a symmetrical system,
the permissible outer limits of these margins of fluctuation for all currencies-including
the dollar-might be set in the same range as now permitted for nondolar currencies
trading aajpt each other. N.Y. Times, supra note 121, at 70, col. 5.
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2. Optional Margins
In much the same way suggested by the Executive Directors, 3 0 the
United States plans foresee margins of different sizes to suit the needs and
interests of specific member-nations. Thus, countries in the process of
forming a monetary union may prefer narrower margins among them-
selves, and would be allowed to set them accordingly. Developing nations
which would prefer narrower margins for development purposes would
also be accorded this option.
The United States plan also envisions circumstances in which countries
may wish to "float" their currencies. This would also be permitted within
the authority of the IMF, but with the caveat that they ". . . should be
required to observe more stringent standards of behavior in other respects
to assure the consistency of [their] actions with the basic requirements of
a cooperative order."' 3 '
B. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT
1. Adjustment through Exchange Rates
The proposals made by the United States recognize the vital role which
the adjustment mechanism plays in the success of the international mone-
tary system,3 2 and, like the Report of the Executive Directors, envision
the employment of objective criteria to determine the timing and size of
the adjustment of a nation's exchange rate. The United States, however,
proposes that the major criterion be ".. .disproportionate gains or losses
in reserves ... .133 for a nation. A disproportionate gain would indicate a
nation in surplus and call for revaluation of that currency in order to
reduce the surplus. A disproportionate loss of reserves, on the other hand,
would indicate a nation in deficit, and call for devaluation of the cur-
130. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
131. N.Y. Times, supra note 121, at 70, col. 5.
132. "In a system of convertibility and central values, an effective balance-of-payments
adjustment process is inextricably linked to appropriate criteria for changes in central
values and the appropriate level, trend, and distribution of reserves. Agreement on these
matters, and on other elements of an effective and timely adjustment process, is essen-
tial to make a system both practical and durable." Id. at 70, cols. 5-6.
133. "I]he most promising approach would be to insure that a surfeit of reserves
indicates, and produces pressure for, adjustment on the surplus side, as losses of reserves
already do for the deficit side. Supplementary guides and several technical approaches
may be feasible and should be examined. Important transitional difficulties will need to
be overcome. But, in essence .... disproportionate gains or losses in reserves may be
the most equitable and effective single indicator we have to guide the adjustment
process." Id. at 70, col. 6.
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rency. The underlying principle of such an approach is that surplus na-
tions have as much obligation to take action to adjust their payments
imbalances by exchange rate adjustment as do deficit nations. 18 4 This
principle, however, is ".... far from universally accepted abroad .... , 18
and will constitute a major difficulty in negotiations.
2. Other Methods of Adjustment
Large revaluations or devaluations are not the only methods of ad-
justment supported by the United States. A nation would be free to
make small changes in its exchange rates on its own initiative in an
attempt to adjust imbalances, although no indication of the limits of a
"small" change is offered. Were the imbalances to continue with a dis-
proportionate gain or loss of reserves, a nation would build a "... . prima
facie case for a larger devaluation .... ,,136 to be made at some point
"... [u]nder appropriate international surveillance."' 137
The United States plan offers further options for adjustment in lieu of
a change in the exchange rate. The first option encourages nations, where
appropriate, to engage in strict internal monetary and fiscal discipline to
adjust imbalances, and second, ".... in exceptional circumstances and for
a limited period . ,,.3s a nation may be permitted to impose direct
restraints on trade as long as they are general and nondiscriminatory.
3. International Monetary Discipline
Under the United States plan, the role for the IMF would presumably
be restricted to approval of large changes in par-value, as it is now.8 0 The
optional methods of adjustment would be at the member-nation's discre-
tion, and even a large alteration of par-value would still be initiated by
the nation concerned, and not by the IMF as the Directors had pro-
posed. 40 The United States plan does, however, provide for some of the
leverage the Directors viewed as necessary to urge needed changes for
adjustment. Rather than grant to the IMF the power to initiate changes
in a nation's exchange rate in order to force adjustment, the United States
134. Id. at 71, col. 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 70, col. 6.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
140. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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plan recommends the use of various sanctions, which would be imposed
by the IMF. For example, a nation, facing a disproportionate decrease in
its reserves, which failed to take the necessary adjustment measures, might
be deprived of its drawing rights or SDR allocations, thereby depriving
it of the sources of reserves necessary to finance its deficit.
A nation with a disproportionate increase in its reserves, however,
which failed to make adjustment would be deprived of its right to demand
conversion of the foreign currencies it had accumulated through its sur-
plus, thereby depriving it of the benefits of its surplus. As a last resort, the
United States recommends that, outside of the IMF framework, ". . . in
the absence of a truly effective combination of corrective measures, other
countries should ultimately be free to protect their interests by a sur-
charge on the imports from the chronic surplus country."141 The sur-
charges would have the same effect as a revaluation of the surplus nation's
currency vis-ti-vis the surcharging nation.
C. ASSET SETTLEMENT
While recognizing its obligation to convert official dollar holdings into
other reserve assets, the United States has made it clear in its proposals
that asset settlement can come into operation only after a transitional
period.142 The final decision to engage in a specific asset settlement ar-
rangement, however, will rest upon the demonstrated capacity of the
United States to meet its obligations by increasing its reserve position
through a balance of payments surplus. Thus the United States has pro-
posed that asset settlement be deferred until a future date when, after a
transitional period during which the reformed adjustment mechanism
may take effect through devaluation of the dollar or revaluation of other
currencies, the United States will enjoy a surplus in its balance of pay-
ments. The resultant increase of United States reserves would ease the
obligation of conversion of outstanding dollars, and lessen the official role
the IMF would play in asset settlement arrangements.
141. N.Y. Times, supra note 121, at 70, col. 6.
142. In the words of Secretary Schultz: "I am fully aware that the United States, as
well as other countries, cannot leap into new monetary and trading arrangements
without a transitional period. I can state, however, that after such transitional period
the United States would be prepared to undertake an obligation to convert official
foreign dollar holdings into other reserve assets as a part of a satisfactory system . . .
assuring effective and equitable operation of the adjustment process. That decision will,
of course, need to rest on our reaching a demonstrated capacity during the transitional
period to meet the obligation in terms of our reserve and balance-of-payments position."
Id. at 70, col. 8.
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This position is in opposition to the Report of the Executive Directors,
which views asset settlement arrangements as a necessary part of any
present reform of the international monetary system.143 The United States
proposals indicate the possibility of compromise, however. The Plan notes
that official foreign currency holdings need be neither generally banned
nor encouraged. Furthermore, it notes that the maintenance of such hold-
ings can provide a useful margin of flexibility in reserve management, and
suggests ".... careful study.., be given to proposals for exchanging part
of existing reserve-currency holdings into a special issue of SDR's, at the
option of the holder. ' 144 Presumably, the third method of asset settlement
proposed by the Executive Directors, which was voluntary and did not
require reserve centers to engage in immediate conversion of their out-
standing liabilities, would be acceptable to the United States. In this way
member-nations could convert excess dollar holdings through the IMF,
while the United States could refrain from settlement during a transi-
tional period in an attempt to improve its reserve position.
It should also be noted, however, that the United States called for a
"special issue" of SDR's to accommodate official holders of surplus dollars.
A "special issue" of SDR's implies issuance through the existing SDR
methods of allocation, 45 on a one-time-only basis. The Directors, how-
ever, have recommended a permanent "substitution facility" which would
create SDR's for exchange of officially-held surplus dollars on a continuing
basis. 146 This apparent conflict may prove to be a difficult point of nego-
tiation in the near future.
D. RESER vE ASSETS
The United States proposal contemplates an increased role for SDR's,
in the sense that they would become the official "numeraire"' 47 of the
system. To facilitate this, the United States also proposes an end to the
143. See notes 88 & 89 supra and accompanying text.
144. N.Y. Times, supra note 121, at 70, col. 5 (emphasis added).
145. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
146. See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text.
147. "Numeraire" is the term given to that asset in terms of which all others' assets
are valued. In the present system, the numeraire is gold, all currencies and SDR's
ultimately being valued according to their worth in gold. The United States proposal,
if adopted, would value all currencies in terms of SDR's. This is not to say, however,
that gold would no longer be a reserve asset: "I do not expect Governmental holdings
of gold to disappear overnight. I do believe orderly procedures are available to facilitate
a diminishing role of gold in international monetary affairs in the future." N.Y. Times,
supra note 121, at 70, col. 5.
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reconstitution obligation, designation procedures, and holding limits. Al-
though the Executive Directors have implied that these encumbrances on
SDR 's might be removed, they are reluctant to replace gold with SDR's as
the system's numeraire.148
The United States also proposes a method by which world reserves
could be controlled through SDR's. This would involve a periodic review
of changes in the amount of SDR's allocated in order to meet any in-
creased need for reserves. The Executive Directors are, however, silent on
this point.
Iv
FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF REFORM
New trends in the thinking on international monetary policy are
rapidly taking shape. The 1972 Report of the Executive Directors of the
IMF has integrated these trends into a comprehensive study of the inter-
national monetary system, its flaws, and the direction of long-awaited
reform. The three requirements of successful reform are: 1) an improve-
ment in the exchange rate mechanism; 2) asset settlement; and 3) an en-
larged role for Special Drawing Rights in place of gold and reserve cur-
rencies. The interrelationship of these three steps is such that the imple-
mentation of one impels adoption of the others; therefore, they must be
employed in conjunction and cannot be instituted seriatum.
The final form of the exchange rate mechanism will include a substan-
tial role for the IMF in the initiation of parity adjustments. It will likely
contain a provision for wider margins around par, with a compromise
option of maintaining narrow margins for those member-states, such as
developing nations, which are likely to profit from the greater stability.149
A major aim of a reformed exchange mechanism will be to restore some
measure of control and responsibility to reserve centers for their own
exchange rates. To this end, a strong provision for achieving asset settle-
ment will probably be included, with several recommendations for deal-
ing with the sticky technical aspects of timing and method of imple-
mentation.
Intrinsic to any asset settlement arrangements is an expanded role for
148. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
149. An option, such as that offered by Article IV relating to methods of maintaining
parity, may be employed to permit some individual choice of margins.
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SDR's. This will be accomplished by the creation of a facility empowered
to create, sell and buy SDR's and, perhaps, to exchange reserve currencies
as well. Further suggestions go a long way towards transforming SDR's
into an international currency, and include a freer use of SDR's, with an
increase in acceptance obligation requirements, an increase in the special
interest rate, and, concurrently, deemphasis, although not abandonment,
of the present designation mechanism.
Future negotiations on monetary reform will focus on these lines. This
is not to say, however, that final reform will precisely mirror the Report's
proposals, for cooperation and compromise are of course the heart of any
international agreement.15 0 It is fairly certain, however, that the reformed
system will reflect elements of a substantial number of the proposals
made in the Report.
Gregory A. Baldwin
150. "... [I]t must be recognized that however well any new arrangements are de-
signed, their success cannot be ensured without the determined cooperation of members
in a more effective functioning of the system as a whole." Report on Reform, supra
note 2, at 10.
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